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10 years after Bucharest
Why NATO should 
double-down on 
Georgian membership
2018 is a momentous year for Georgia: it marks the  
100th anniversary of the first Democratic Republic of 
Georgia. It is also the 10th anniversary of the war with 
Russia (August 2008) and of the Bucharest Summit, 
when Tbilisi was promised a seat at NATO’s table.
A decade on, NATO-Georgia cooperation has 
substantially deepened. The country now meets  
NATO standards in many areas: it has modernised its 
armed forces and interoperability between Georgian 
troops and the armies of NATO countries has increased. 
Georgia has contributed more to international NATO 
missions than many existing members and also meets 
the Alliance’s defence spending target. Tbilisi has also 
undertaken reforms to strengthen democracy, eradicate 
corruption and ensure civilian control of the military.
NATO has repeatedly reiterated its promise, but a 
long-coveted Membership Action Plan (MAP) remains 
elusive, despite Georgia being at least as prepared as 
Montenegro was when it joined the Alliance in 2017. 
Concerns over Moscow’s possible reaction is the main 
reason for stalling. Russian military adventurism in 
Georgia and Ukraine heightened anxieties about further 
eastern enlargement.
Georgia has become an important ally for NATO. Its 
relationship with the Alliance far exceeds the MAP 
framework. While popular support for membership 
remains high at 65%,1 it could wane, however, if Georgia 
remains indefinitely in NATO’s waiting room. This risks 
giving weight to the Russian narrative that the West does 
not want Georgia and harming the reform momentum 
spurred by the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration.
The 11-12 July 2018 NATO Brussels Summit is 
an opportunity for the Alliance. Given Georgia’s 
commitment to transatlantic security, it is in NATO’s 
interest to strengthen ties with Tbilisi. As a reliable 
partner that shares common interests and values, the 
country offers the West a strategic foothold in the South 
Caucasus. The Alliance must reaffirm its membership 
commitment and reiterate that no third country has 
a veto on its enlargement. It should further deepen 
practical cooperation and bolster Georgia’s ability 
to defend itself. Reaffirming NATO’s support would 
reassure Georgian society, boost reform efforts and move 
the country ever closer to the Alliance.
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Georgia has contributed more to 
international NATO missions than many 
existing members and also meets the 
Alliance’s defence spending target. 
BACKGROUND – GEORGIA’S  
EURO-ATLANTIC CHOICE
In the aftermath of independence, Georgia joined the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership 
for Peace. With a centuries-old European identity, 
Georgians view themselves as naturally belonging to the 
transatlantic family and see NATO membership as the 
only choice for ensuring national security.
Geographically located at a strategic crossroads, Georgia 
offered its territory for the transit of NATO forces to 
1  Results of March 2018 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia
Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Cooperation 
with the Euro-Atlantic community deepened after 
the 2003 Rose Revolution when young pro-western 
reformers came to power in Tbilisi. Today, Georgia is a 
crucial transit route for Caspian hydrocarbons heading 
to Europe. While challenges remain, including issues 
with the independence of the judiciary, the country has 
taken significant steps to boost democracy, liberalise  
the economy, and fight corruption.
The most significant boost in practical military cooperation 
followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. From a European 
security perspective, strengthening the resilience of 
neighbours to enable them to withstand coercion from 
Russia had become crucial. 
At the 2014 Cardiff Summit, Tbilisi obtained the 
Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). It aims 
to strengthen Georgia’s military capability including 
advancing its territorial defence capabilities and boosting 
security sector reform. High-level experts from 26 NATO 
countries have been training and advising Georgia’s 
military and civilian institutions. Georgia has also become 
one of the Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP), which 
provides all of the privileges that Alliance members 
receive except for the collective security umbrella.
Georgia is a major contributor to NATO operations. 
Since 2012, it has been the largest per capita contributor 
to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. 
The country is also the only non-NATO country to join 
NATO’s rapid response team.
NATO’s presence in Georgia further increased with 
the opening of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and 
Evaluation Centre in 2015. Joint military exercises have 
had a reassuring effect on Georgian society.
Bilateral cooperation, particularly with Washington, has 
also increased. The Defence Readiness Programme aims 
to improve Georgia’s territorial defence, while a 2016 
Memorandum on Deepening the Defence and Security 
Partnership opened the way for military aid and sales of 
advanced arms. Georgia thus received 410 Javelin anti-
tank missiles and 72 launch units in April 2018. The US 
Army will shortly open a Joint Multinational Readiness 
Centre, a training centre to prepare troops for land 
warfare. It will be only the second such post outside the 
US, after Germany.
Tbilisi has done everything NATO has asked for and 
more. Nevertheless, geography remains Georgia’s 
Achilles heel. Ongoing resistance has nothing to do with 
the country’s readiness for membership and everything 
to do with Russia’s presumed reaction. This approach 
gives Moscow veto power over a sovereign country’s 
decision and undermines the credibility of the “open 
door policy”.
A selective open door policy?
While Montenegro’s accession in 2017 is proof of 
NATO’s “open door policy”, it represents a double-edged 
sword for Georgia: it signals that the Alliance is open 
to further expansion, but it also shows bias as in some 
areas Montenegro was less prepared than Georgia, such 
as the fight against corruption.
Despite Russia’s opposition, NATO moved ahead with 
Montenegro’s membership. The integration of the 
Western Balkan states into NATO and the EU has long 
been seen as crucial in preventing war in the region and 
thus vital for European security.
Viewing Georgia as a reliable ally and a beacon of 
democracy, former US President G. W. Bush strongly 
supported its NATO aspirations and called for Tbilisi to 
receive a MAP at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. Some 
European partners, notably France and Germany, did not 
share his enthusiasm. While both argued that Georgia was 
not ready to receive a MAP, concern over Russia’s reaction 
was pivotal. Moscow had voiced its firm opposition 
to further eastern enlargement. While the Summit 
Declaration did not offer a MAP, it promised NATO entry.
With NATO promising eventual membership without 
a concrete timeframe, Moscow had every incentive 
to keep Georgia weak and unstable, so that it would 
never become eligible for membership. Four months 
later Russia invaded Georgia. Russian soldiers came 
within a few kilometres of Tbilisi. While the war did not 
change Georgia’s NATO aspirations, wariness within 
the Alliance increased. Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine have further 
heightened concerns. The lack of meaningful reaction to 
Russia’s aggression in Georgia bolstered its confidence 
in invading Ukraine.
While NATO has reiterated its commitment to Georgia 
in every subsequent summit declaration since 2008, 
Georgia has bent over backwards to demonstrate that it 
can be a net contributor to Euro-Atlantic security.
STATE OF PLAY – GOING ABOVE AND BEYOND
In addition to taking significant steps to meet NATO 
standards and improve its defence capabilities after the 2008 
war, Georgia made a unilateral commitment to the non-use 
of force to resolve the protracted conflicts on its territory.
Georgia-NATO cooperation has significantly deepened 
through the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual 
National Programme (ANP), which sets the policy and 
reform priorities for Georgia’s NATO membership.
With NATO promising eventual 
membership without a concrete timeframe, 
Moscow had every incentive to keep Georgia 
weak and unstable, so that it would never 
become eligible for membership. Four 
months later Russia invaded Georgia.
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Georgia’s case is more complicated: not only does the 
country border Russia, but there are two protracted 
conflicts on its territory. As NATO’s policy makes clear, 
however, the resolution of territorial disputes is a factor 
to be considered in evaluating a new member’s suitability, 
not a precondition. Russia’s occupation of the Tskhinvali 
Region and Abkhazia, where it maintains a significant 
military presence, gives the Kremlin a platform to create 
instability and block progress towards resolving the 
conflicts. Nevertheless, as recently proposed by Luke 
Coffey,2 NATO could grant membership by temporarily 
excluding Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region from 
NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee.
Creeping Annexation
Beginning with the August 2008 war, as Georgia has 
strengthened its defence capabilities, Russia has 
consolidated its military presence in Abkhazia and 
the Tskhinvali Region, which Moscow recognises as 
independent states. Both regions have signed so-called 
security treaties with Russia, incorporating their troops 
into the Russian army. Furthermore, Russia continues 
to move the administrative lines between the occupied 
territories and Georgian controlled territory. This so-
called “borderisation” process has resulted in Georgia 
losing more land while ordinary people often lose their 
homes. The killing of Georgian citizens, including Archil 
Tatunashvili, underlines the grave situation in the 
occupied territories. 
primarily due to concerns over Russia. It will be difficult 
for countries that support Georgian membership, such as 
the Baltic States and the Visegrad group, to convince those 
that remain sceptical. It also seems unlikely that the US 
can play a pivotal role. Despite the Trump Administration 
reaffirming its support for Georgia’s aspirations, it is not 
a priority for the US President. Tensions between the US 
and European partners on several issues, including trade, 
further complicate the situation. 
Relations with Russia also seem bound to remain 
adversarial. In this context, NATO has reinforced its 
forward deterrence on its Eastern flank, including 
the Baltic states that feel threatened after Russia’s 
aggression in Ukraine. It should not rule out further 
enlargement, however. In reality, Russia is unlikely to 
declare war against a NATO member. Instead, it will step 
up efforts to destabilise these countries through cyber-
warfare and low-level subversion.
Doubling down on Georgia
Russia’s aggressive revisionism in the Black Sea 
region and its power projection in the Middle East 
have increased the strategic significance of the Black 
Sea region. Given Georgia’s pro-Western policies and 
commitment to transatlantic security, NATO should 
double down on Georgia, boosting support to further 
sharpen resilience and territorial defence. The Brussels 
Summit is an opportunity to send a positive message.
As a first step, the meetings of the NATO-Georgia 
Commission, currently held at ministerial level during 
summits, should be upgraded to Heads of State level as 
is the case for Ukraine. The Summit Declaration should:
q  assert the alliance’s firm recognition of Georgia’s 
progress in the context of NATO’s open door policy;
q  reaffirm Georgia’s territorial integrity;
q  reiterate that Russia’s ongoing occupation of 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region is unacceptable;
q  call on Moscow to meet the entirety of its obligations 
under the 2008 ceasefire agreement; and
q  underline that NATO does not accept spheres of 
influence and Russian efforts to draw a new red line 
through Europe.
It is also essential to propose new areas for practical 
cooperation, notably in:
q  The Black Sea: With Russia’s military presence in the 
Black Sea increasing, the Warsaw Summit Declaration 
underlined the strategic importance of the region and 
its security. Allies agreed on developing a Tailored 
Forward Presence along with the establishment of 
a Multinational Framework Brigade in Romania. 
While this was an essential first step, NATO should 
elaborate an ambitious vision for the Black Sea, which 
should involve not only regional NATO allies but 
Georgia has proven to be a steadfast  
Euro-Atlantic partner. All NATO members 
agree that it has done everything  
to show its commitment to the alliance  
and prepare itself for membership.
2  Luke Coffey, NATO Membership for Georgia: In US and European 
Interest, The Heritage Foundation, 2018.
Russia has also failed to implement fully the 6-point 
ceasefire agreement negotiated in 2008. It prevents the EU 
Monitoring Mission from entering the occupied territories 
and blocks the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Russia’s soft power onslaught in Georgia is also 
relentless. Even though public support for Euro-Atlantic 
integration currently remains high, hybrid warfare is used to 
undermine it, including exploiting Georgia’s lack of a MAP.
PROSPECTS – A CHALLENGING ROAD AHEAD
Georgia has proven to be a steadfast Euro-Atlantic 
partner. All NATO members agree that it has done 
everything to show its commitment to the alliance and 
prepare itself for membership.
While NATO reiterates its commitment to membership, 
a broad consensus on this issue remains absent, however, 
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also cooperation with NATO-aspirants. NATO should 
include Georgia in any new initiative, including Black 
Sea air patrolling (similar to the Baltic Air Police 
Mission) that could be initiated by Turkey, Bulgaria, 
and Romania. Since Georgia actively participates in EU 
CSDP missions, new EU-NATO initiatives related to 
the Black Sea could also include Georgia.
q  Countering hybrid threats: While strategic 
communication is part of the SNGP, efforts to 
counter social media propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns should be scaled up. Strengthening 
cybersecurity cooperation is also crucial. A 
meaningful step would be to establish in Georgia a 
‘Black Sea NATO Centre of Excellence’ focused on 
improving cybersecurity resilience both in Georgia 
and the rest of the region.
 
q  Boosting defence capacity: NATO should further 
expand Georgia’s territorial defence capabilities by 
enhancing troop operability, aiding the acquisition 
of modern military equipment, and increasing joint 
military exercises. The concept of ‘more NATO in 
Georgia and more Georgia in NATO’ should continue 
to be the cornerstone of the partnership. This could 
entail supplying anti-aircraft and air defence weapons 
and building up Georgia’s maritime capabilities.
q  The Enhanced Forward Presence: Given Georgia’s 
excellent track record in serving alongside NATO 
troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Georgia should 
be invited to join the multinational battalion based 
in Poland.
Given that Georgia has already met all the requirements, 
NATO should dispense with the MAP process. MAP has 
become politicised to the point where it is undermining 
domestic support for Euro-Atlantic integration. The SGNP 
and ANP are a roadmap for meeting NATO standards and 
preparing for membership and should be recognised as the 
primary tools for Georgian accession.
There are also steps that the Georgian government 
should take.
q  First, Georgia should continue to implement the 
SNGP and the ANP. Intensifying internal security 
coordination is crucial. Boosting its ability to 
coordinate strategic communication and counter 
hybrid threats should also become a priority.
q  Second, Georgia should intensify cooperation with 
European NATO members, not least Germany and 
France, to enhance its image as a reliable partner and 
thus boost support for its membership.
q  Third, efforts to engage with the populations of the 
Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia should continue. In 
April 2018, the government presented a peace initiative 
– ‘A Step to a Better Future’ – aimed to facilitate trade, 
provide educational opportunities and give access 
to the benefits of European integration. While the 
separatist governments rejected the initiative, Georgia’s 
willingness to build bridges is a positive step and Tbilisi 
should persevere in that direction.
Georgia will need patience
Divisions within NATO, the lack of a robust strategy 
towards Russia, and growing transatlantic tensions 
mean membership is not around the corner. Georgia 
will have to show strategic patience and perseverance. 
Tbilisi should use to the maximum all the tools that 
NATO has put on the table and continue to push 
for more. Relations will continue to deepen further 
transforming the country’s military and bolstering 
Georgia’s resilience. Hence, Georgia will incrementally 
become part of NATO.
However, NATO should understand that its current 
policy of keeping Georgia in an ambiguous limbo 
undermines the alliance’s credibility and reinforces 
the Russian narrative that the West does not 
want Georgia, thus advancing Moscow’s goals 
of discrediting liberal Euro-Atlantic values and 
establishing special zones of influence. 
This equivocal situation only encourages Russia to defy 
further the West, which in turn spurs instability. It also 
undermines the commitment made by NATO after the 
Cold War, that the nations formerly within the Soviet 
Union’s sphere of influence could feel confident that 
they would be safe from renewed Russian aggression.
In September 2017, NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg reiterated that the alliance is committed 
to the goal of membership. It is time for NATO to prove 
that this is more than an empty statement.
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